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THE DEGREE OF CIllMPANZEE THEORY OF MIND
AND THE EVOLUTION OF MODULARITY

Benjamin Grant Purzycki

Department of Anthropology and Geography
University of Nebraska-Lincoln
Lincoln, Nebraska 68588

ABSTRACT

The difficulty of finding definitive evidence is quite a
task to overcome, as we tend to anthropomorphize our
subjects in order to explain their behavior.

Whether or not chimpanzees have the ability to mentally
represent others' mental states or theory of mind (ToM) has
yet to be definitively established. This results from three
problems. First, modular theory of mind accounts lead researchers to adopt an either/or approach to psychological
faculties which obfuscates both within- and across-species
variability. Second, present research continues to rely on the
continued trend to polarize nature and nurture. Third, the
bulk of the work compares humans with chimpanzees rather
than looking at the entire range of primate species. I propose
"degree approach" by way of the Integrated Causal Model
which particularizes the key components to ToM while maintaining the tenets of modularity theory. According to this
account, while chimpanzees may not have a ToM that is equal
to our own, they nevertheless exhibit behaviors that are
indeed indicative of having one as illustrated by comparison
to other extant primate research.

MENTAL ORGANS
AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
According to the most conservative 'definitions of
modularity, there are four key components to a modular faculty of mind: encapsulation, domain specificity,
inaccessibility, and innateness (Fodor 1983, 1998,
Sperber 2002). Encapsulation, or "informational encapsulation" is the idea that within them, modules
have hardwired information which informs perception.
Domain-specificity is a given module's body of relevant
.knowledge; it is specifically designed for a particular
body of information (Hirschfeld and Gelman 1994), e.g.
language, a template-system of intuitive ontology, naive physics, etc. (Boyer 2001, Chomsky 2000, Vosniadou
1994). "Inaccessibility" refers to the idea that while
incoming stimuli can alter neither the encapsulated
information nor the state of the information therein,
the target module cannot inform outside information
(Fodor 1998). Put in an evolutionary perspective, the
question becomes how such discrete cognitive functions
evolve, given they are genetically determined.

t t t
Given our close genetic relationship to chimpanzees (Pan paniscus), much can be learned about our
own cognitive processes by way of comparison. However, the reverse is also true; with what we know of our
own minds, what can we learn about other organisms'
mental activities, and what are the constraints that
limit our ability to acquire such knowledge? The best
prepared theory for making such an inquiry is that of
the computational or modular mind (Fodor 1983). However, when comparing psychological faculties of two
closely related species, new questions emerge that require rethinking previously held conceptions of the limits of particular faculties. Two primary problems arise
upon examination of chimpanzee ToM within the modular framework: namely, the tendency to think of modules in an either/or manner ("you have the faculty or
not," see Povinelli and Vonk 2004, Tomasello et al.
2003) and the tendency to polarize unnecessarily natUre (what is innate) and nurture (what is learned).

Tooby and Cosmides (1992) aptly articulate the
main theoretical difference between behaviorist and
nativist approaches to the mind. They distinguish
between what they call the Standard Social Science
Model (SSSM) and the Integrated Causal Model (ICM).
The SSSM is maintains that "the central concept in
psychology [has been] learning," rather than innateness (1992). In other words, most behavior is learned,
rather than an expression of genetically endowed faculties and their relationship with learned information.
And such learning, according to the SSSM, must be
59
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"equipotential, content-free, content-independent, general-purpose, domain -general.. .these mechanisms [of
learning] must be constructed in such a way that they
can absorb any kind of cultural message or environmental input equally well" (Tooby and Cosmides 1992).
The ICM, on the other hand, attempts to locate specific
"mental organs" (Chomsky 1980) of the mind, their
function(s), and under what conditions are they function optimally. In sum, this dichotomy of nature/nurture is problematically too simple when confronted with
the growth of mental faculties, and the dichotomybased approach provides the first frame of dilemmas
arising from previous investigations of chimpanzee and
human ToM. There are two main assumptions that
guide the following investigation: 1) some components
of the mind are at the very least modular by Fodor's
account (for a debate within the realm of computational
psychology, see Fodor 2005, Pinker 2005a, 2005b) and
2) the ToMM (theory of mind mechanism or module) is
a module in this sense at least in humans.
Baron-Cohen (1999) notes that there are eight behavioral requirements that must be met in order to
grant an organism a ToM, namely: 1) intentionally
communicating with others; 2) repairing failed communication with others; 3) teaching others; 4) intentionally persuading others; 5) intentionally deceiving others; 6) building shared plans and goals; 7) intentionally
sharing a focus or topic of intention; and 8) pretending.
Baron-Cohen unnecessarily separates "persuasion" and
"deception" as deception is simply a specific form of
persuasion; deception is successful persuasion of something false. However, all of the above requirements
spring from the core qualities of a ToM: understanding
beliefs, desires, and intentions in others. As discussed
below, chimpanzees fulfill most of these requirements
primarily by way of Machiavellian intelligence (see
below) which, not surprisingly, is the most difficult to
isolate in an experimental setting.
Concerning the growth of innate faculties, our own
species illustrates an interesting trend during development. Gopnik and Wellman (1994) note that there are
three main stages of a child's cognitive development
with regards to the ToM. At two years, a child is
equipped with two basic categories of mental activity,
namely desires and perceptions. In other words, a
landmark achievement in childhood development is an
understanding of others' mental states such as needsthe understanding that "what is in the mind can change
what is in the world"-and the understanding that
"what is in the mind depends on what is in the world"
(Gopnik and Wellman 1994). By three years of age, an
elaboration of mental activities and states occurs. Such
concepts of "think, know, remember, make-believe,
dream" are understood as mental activities, while 5-

year-old mental states including "beliefs [and falsebeliefs], pretences, and images" are but a few of the
psychological categories acquired by normally developed children.
Baron-Cohen's (1997) groundbreaking essay on
"mind-blindness" of autistic children who lack or have
an impaired ToM illustrates that understanding mental states is quite a task-if possible-for individuals
afflicted with such disorders. In this domain of cognitive processing, one would expect, then, that chimpanzees would behave in a similar manner to autists who
have impaired theory of mind mechanism or module
(ToMM). This raises the first problem with an Either/
Or approach to ToM and modularity in general: ifmodules can be impaired, certainly there are aspects of a
given faculty that are operational, therefore implying
that modules have degrees of functionality. Take for
instance, individuals who suffer from Asperger's Syndrome (AS). AS is placed on what is called the "Autism
Spectrum," just short of high-functioning autism (BaronCohen 2003). Arguably, AS is a step above Attention
Deficit Disorder (ADD) and Attention Deficit and Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) since the symptoms relevant to ToM (e.g. difficulty with empathy, poor social
interaction, etc.) clearly overlap with that of AS and
high-functioning autism (Booth et al. 2003, Clark et al.
1999, Williams 2004).
Individuals who are diagnosed with AS, ADD, and
ADHD exhibit a number of behaviors that are found
among autists who have impairments of what constitutes a ToM, ranging from a less functioning sense of
empathy, difficulty in social settings, etc. Frith and
Happe (1999) note that evidence suggests children with
AS are not as good as normally functioning children at
attributing mental states, but certainly improve their
ability to do so as they develop, unlike those with
autism. Such difficulties are the result of a less elaborate ToM. This, in turn, implies that ToM ought to be
measured by way of a spectrum or "host of symptoms"
rather than as a present/absent module.
Can such a spectrum, then, extend to chimpanzees?
This question represents another problem with the
Either/Or approach to modularity: if there is indeed
variation within species in terms ofthe functioning of a
module, is there inter-species variability of the same
faculty? Ifwe are to conceptualize modules as "mental
organs," should we not then acknowledge the possibility for variability across species as we would understand differences in the heart, brain, eyes and other
organs? Evolutionarily, the human eye was not selected for per se, but rather the gradual developments
of the eye, however, were (Tooby and Cosmides 1992).
We should think of modules in the same manner.

Chimpanzee theory of mind and modularity

CHIMPANZEE THEORY OF MIND
Premack and Woodruff (1978) were the first to ask
whether chimpanzees have a ToM, and by extension, a
ToMM. They argue that an individual's ability to attribute mental states to another is not a recent development but rather an old faculty. The question of whether
or not the chimpanzee (or human, for that matter) is
correct in his/her inference of attributing a mental state
to another is irrelevant (but interesting)-the question
is whether such inferences occur. Byrne and Whiten
(1992) elaborate: "If an individual is able to respond
differentially, according to the beliefs and desires of
another individual (rather than according to the other's
overt behaviour), then it possesses a theory of mind."
In sum, then, a behavior exhibiting a reaction based on
an understanding of another's beliefs and desires would
be the shadow cast from the substance of the ToMM.
While most argue that "reading minds" is an innate
faculty of our species and-by extension-chimpanzees, others argue that such a trait is wholly learned.
For instance, Perner et al. (1994) argue that children
with more siblings learn to infer others' mental states
quicker than those with fewer siblings; and, therefore,
a ToM is learned. The main problem with the thesis of
Perner et al. is the fact that they confuse mastery of
mind reading with the ability to read minds. In other
words, if a child is not employing or "exercising" this
faculty, they will not be as adept at identifying falsebeliefs, intentions, etc. to a given agent. It should be
argued, however, that having more siblings better prepares the ToMM, rather than actually "bestowing" it
upon an individual. Perner et al. (1994) contend that
their findings create a "serious problem for nativist
proposals and various developmental explanations relying on internal maturation." Unfortunately, these
authors remain unclear regarding the distinction between learned vs. developed (what is already there)
when they claim that "the finding that siblings help
develop a theory of mind is compatible with the
sociocognitive tradition [which emphasizes] intellectual
progress as a function of social interaction among peers
and view intellectual growth as a process of internalizing the knowledge already incorporated in the social
interaction" (1994).
In sum, the data of Perner et al. do not create
problems for "nativist proposals" as they claim-if anything they support them, as "poverty of the stimulus"
arguments contend (see below for "Plato's problem").
Put differently, Chomsky (1980) argues that "a central
part of what we call 'learning' is actually better understood as the growth of cognitive structures [which are
innately endowed] along an internally directed course
under the triggering and partially shaping effect of the
environment." If this truly is the case, one may feasibly
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pose the question to Perner et al.: where did onlychildren "learn" a theory of mind?
If the answer is from the parents, that would certainly not disqualify a single child from ''learning'' a
theory of mind, but rather reducing the amount of
stimulation that engages the ToMM. But "poverty of
the stimulus" arguments contend that the stimulus
itself is impoverished (in this case, behavior)-a great
deal of our thinking is the result of inference-making
by way of innate cognitive structures rather than a
recording of all behaviors and outcomes (Boyer 2001).
What we see is extremely limited-what we intuit is
just as, if not more, important than the behaviors that
stimulate mental activity (Fodor 1984). In sum, then,
the question of ToM should not spring from the all-too
simplistic dichotomy of nature/nurture but rather how
these two interact (Richerson and Boyd 2005). The
same may be said of chimpanzees raised in captivity
that "learn" behaviors indicative of a ToM as discussed
below.
Machiavellianism has been defined as "a strategy
of social conduct that involves manipulating others for
personal gain, often against the other's self-interest"
(Wilson et al. 1996, quoted in Byrne and Whiten 1997).
If a chimpanzee fools another in order. to, acquire resources (sexual or nutritional) for example, the "fooling" alone does not necessarily suggest a ToM immediately. On the other hand, such acts of deception which
rely on "whether an individual can discriminate
another's false belief would be the most convincing way
to demonstrate a true reading of 'mind"' (Whiten 1997).
Has this been demonstrated?
Franz de Waal (2000) recounts how a chimpanzee
called Yeroen mildly hurt his hand in a fight with
another chimp named Nikkie. One observer noticed
that Yeroen only limped when Nikkie was around.
Franz de Waal confirmed this when he noticed that
once Yeroen was out ofNikkie's field of vision , he would
walk normally. Not only does this imply that chimpanzees are aware that "seeing is knowing" (see below), but
also that an individual chimp wanted another to believe
he was hurt. This behavior lasted a week, during which
Yeroen monitored Nikkie to see ifhe was being watched
(Ibid.). This example fulfills not only the "pretending"
qualification of possessing a ToM but the "persuasion"
and "deception" components as well. The next grouping of criteria falls under the general heading of "social"
or "shared intentions."
Tomasello et al. (2004) argue that the primary distinction between our own psychological faculties and
that of other species is the ability to cooperate with
other individuals to accomplish the same goal, a trait
with which human individuals affected by autism and
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AS have troubles. What immediately comes to mind is
the question of chimpanzee collaborative hunting, which
Tomasello et al. (2004) consider. The authors determine such cooperation has no difference from hunting
carried out by other social mammals (e.g. lions and
wolves), which operates on impulse and opportunistic
frenzies. In addition, they find it "almost unimaginable
that two chimpanzees might spontaneously do something as simple as carry something together or help one
another make a tool." In the case discussed below, it is
clear that chimpanzees-if given the chance-will behave in a manner that benefits the agent solely rather
than any cooperative behavior that would indicate a
shared intention.
However, Tomasello et al. overlook the fact that
chimpanzees will act cooperatively by forging coalitions
to overthrow an alpha male, let alone work together to
perpetuate the reign of an alpha (de Waal 2000, Goodall
1990). It should be noted that coalitions are created at
fantastically frequent rates, (ca. 1,000-1,500 per year
in captivity), but the overthrowing of an alpha does not
(de Waal 2000). If this irrefutable fact of coalitionbuilding to overthrow an alpha were a result from
"observation" (that is, assuming chimpanzees are true
behaviorists), it would be quite a feat to explain coalition forging and alpha-overthrowing in such terms.
Individuals participating would collectively have to understand that their goal is, indeed, to get rid of an
existing alpha. If chimpanzees were incapable of doing
so, all those involved in the toppling of an alpha would
have to have already observed not only the removal of
an alpha but also a collaborative effort to do so. Moreover, they would have to be able to understand the
outcome as a result from the collaborative effort ifthey
are to repeat the process. Individuals who build coalitions are obviously goal-oriented and require assistance from others to achieve this goal. This suggests,
indeed, that chimpanzees have a basic ToM.
Mundane, everyday behaviors, however, are far better indicators for shared intentionality. Franz De Waal
(2000), for instance, observed that individual chimpanzees will hold enormous branches for others to climb
into trees guarded by electrical fence. The branches
are placed in a manner that requires one individual to
reinforce the instability of the branch while another
climbs the branches in order to gather otherwise unobtainable leaves. Even an adult helping an infant out of
a tree indicates that there is some degree of sharing
intentions by way of understanding another's predicament. Moreover, after engaging in conflict, chimpanzees will avoid each other until one of the combatants
expresses a behavior indicative of a truce (e.g. extending a hand). Such a "collaborative" avoidance not only
indicates mutual animosity, but also suggests that each
individual involved in a conflict "keep in mind" that

alleviating the tension has yet to occur (de WaaI2000).
Turning to a related question: is seeing believing or
indicative of understanding another's mental states?
More specifically, does joint attention imply shared intention? Flombaum and Santos (2005) recently published findings that suggest rhesus monkeys (Macaca
mulatta) are equipped with the understanding that a
researcher's inability to see a hidden grape provides an
opportunity to steal it. This begs for more research
conducted with the full range of primates available for
study (see below for anecdotal evidence). Povinelli and
Eddy (1996a) conducted a study to determine whether
chimpanzees followed a human's gaze. In one case, the
human looked at a specific location with only his eyes,
while in another case the human looked with both eyes
and head. They found that "subjects looked where the
human was looking equally often whether or not the
head was moved, demonstrating the efficacy of eye
direction alone" (Tomasello and Call 1997).
In another experiment (Povinelli and Eddy 1996b),
researchers stared directly at a Plexiglas wall that was
between the chimpanzee and a distant wall. The assumption was that the chimps would bypass the wall,
rather than inspect it, if the line of gaze were of no
particular significance in the chimps' minds. However,
chimps consistently looked at both sides of the partition-with particular emphasis on the side available to
the researcher's view-rather than exhibiting a primary concern with the wall at the end of the room. In
sum, chimpanzees determined that the Plexiglas wall
was of the researcher's interest, rather than blindly
following his line of vision.
Franz de Waal (2000) also reports an occasion when
researchers hid a number of fruits in an enclosed area.
Chimpanzees in an area close saw the researchers enter the area-with a box full of fruit-then leave the
area with an empty box. When the chimps were allowed into the area, they searched "madly" without
finding any of the fruit. One chimp, Dandy, passed by
the hidden fruit without acknowledging them. Later,
when the other apes were sleeping, Dandy made a "beeline" to the fruits, dug them up and quietly ate them
without the others' awareness (2000). Even ifthis were
not the first time Dandy behaved with such cunning, he
still would require an understanding that if he suppressed acknowledgment of the fruit, others would not
enjoy the bounty. Not only was Dandy planning, but
also intentionally, and probably consciously, deceiving
others in order to better himself.
Elsewhere, Byrne and Whiten (1992) review the
complexity of tactical deception. Obviously, "Acts of
deception involve other primates: as objects to be manipulated, as social tools to manipulate others, or even
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sometimes as the resource to be gained." On the other
hand, it also implies that the deceivers/deceived must
be able to both retaliate and remember. The authors
note that "the two Pan species and the Papio baboons
are significantly overrepresented in records of deception. By contrast, no clear case of deception has yet been
reported for strepsirhine primates or tarsiers" (Byrne
and Whiten 1992). The data collected by Byrne and
Whiten were exclusively anecdotal, which opens the
procedural doors to many problems. Povinelli and Vonk
(2003) rightly suggest that anecdotal evidence often
"presupposes a behavioral abstraction" because our own
ToMs are at work as mentioned below in the squirrel
example. However, note that even with Byrne and
Whiten's study, researchers potential ToM attribution
stops with a large body of the Prosimii suborder indicating that such "presuppositions" are selective.
In other words, anecdotal "evidence" for chimpanzees' mental representations inherently relies on the
assumption that representations of behaviors already
occur-something which has yet to be proven, according to Povinelli and Vonk (2003). So, for instance, if one
were to observe a chimpanzee deceiving another into
thinking he does not have food, the observer is already
attributing an understanding of mental states to the
chimpanzee without testing. The problems with experimental procedures that attempt to reveal definitively
that chimps have an understanding of others' mental
states, however, are equally problematic for a variety of
reasons.

DISCUSSION
One must be wary when regarding certain behaviors as indicators of a ToM. Take, for example, a
squirrel that takes flight each time a human approaches.
While it may be inferred that the squirrel has a ToM
because it has an understanding ofthe human's mental
state (e.g. "wanting to eat it"), such a conclusion ignores
the possibility that the squirrel is reacting to the human and not its mental states. However, the reverse
tactic of "turning off our ToM" creates even more problems. Gopnik creates a first-person narrative describing the world according to an autist. People sitting
around the individual are described as "bags of skin
[that] are draped over chairs, and stuffed into pieces of
cloth, they shift and protrude in unexpected ways"
(unpublished essay quoted in Baron-Cohen 1997). Are
we to believe, then, that chimpanzees truly look at the
world-especially their fellow chimps-in this manner? Unfortunately, we tend to grant agency without
necessarily being aware of it. In other words, much of
the time we do not look at others and acknowledge the
fact that we are seeing much more than "hats and coats
which could conceal automatons" (Descartes 1998). The
information that is encapsulated is the attribution of
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agency, and arguably with experience, this attribution
is elaborated and specified: in the case of our own
species, the mental states "dreaming" and "makingbelieve" are not innate, but elaborations or outgrowths
of an agency-detection system (i.e. the ToMM). In the
case of chimpanzees, ToM seems less specific or sophisticated-rather than completely absent (see below). The
question, then, turns itself inward: are we simply anthropomorphizing chimpanzees because of our own innate faculties?
Anthropomorphism has been included in Brown's
human universals, a characteristic that is demonstrated
around the world by all peoples (Brown 1991). While
Brown notes that this trait is generally found in religious contexts, anthropomorphizing occurs in other contexts as well. One common view of anthropomorphism
is the notion that our species animates certain entities
(e.g. gods, ghosts, chimpanzees, etc.) in order to understand them better and to mitigate fears surrounding
them. Boyer (2001) rightly observes that firstly, "gods
and spirits are not represented as having human features in general but as having minds, which is much
more specific" and secondly, "the concept of a mind is
not exclusively human," meaning we attribute agency
to all entities rendered intentional. In other words, we
intuitively (i.e. naturally) attribute a will and desires to
animate entities-this is the crux of anthropomorphism.
Are primate psychologists guilty of inappropriately attributing "a mind" to chimpanzees in this case?
Povinelli and Vonk (2003) suggest that the chimpanzee mind seems so much like our own because "the
human mind may have evolved a unique mental system that cannot help distorting the chimpanzee's mind,
obligatorily recreating it in its own image." Like religious ideas, we may be projecting our own qualities on
chimpanzees by granting them a ToM because of our
own ToM. However, if in fact chimpanzees do have
such an understanding of others' mental states, and we
agree that they do, we would still be anthropomorphizing-we would simply be accurate in our inferencemaking. Moreover, "turning off' our own ToM in order
to understand another's mental states is not a logica\
possibility; we require our ability to represent mentally
other's mental states in order to determine whether or
not he/she/it is able to do likewise. In other words,
determining whether a chimpanzee has a ToM (a mental state) is possible only if we are allowed to infer
mental states.
In what may be the most comprehensive account of
the complexity of the present debate, Heyes (1998)
proposes an experimental study designed to test whether
or not chimpanzees could follow the sight-path of researchers wearing different goggles (opaque and translucent). The chimps would be primed to learn the
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difference between the goggles. The hypothesis was
that if chimps did indeed have a ToM, they would not
bother to follow the gaze of a researcher wearing the
opaque goggles. Kamawar and Olson (1998) conducted
this study with children. While 85% successfully passed
the ToM tasks, half of these passed Heyes' experiment.
In this case, researchers are demanding more from
chimpanzees than humans. Andrews (2005) rightly
argues that even a modified version of Heyes' experiment proposed by Povinelli and Vonk (2004) also assumes that human children do not have a ToM because
of their reliance on the assumption that predicting
behavior rather than explaining behavior is the best
indicator of the presence of a ToM. Moreover, as argued below, all present experimental studies fail simply because they rely on behaviorist (i.e. a persistent
failure of the SSSM) interpretations of mental activity
(i.e. solved by the ICM).
False-belieftasks are designed to determine whether
or not an individual is capable of understanding that
others may entertain an incorrect perception. While
chimpanzees have shown great difficulty with attributing a false-beliefto other individuals compared to normally functioning children, some tasks they eventually
learn (Call and Tomasello 1999). Autistic children fail
these tasks consistently whereas children with Down's
syndrome are successful (which is also indicative of a
ToMM; Baron-Cohen 1997). However, there should be
a clear distinction between the ability to understand
that another may be entertaining a false-belief and the
prevention of a belief that one may not want another to
have. As with the above-mentioned case of Dandy's
concealment of fruit , he has also been observed concealing erections from a threatening alpha male. There are
other cases of another non-alpha keeping his backs
toward an alpha male while attempting copulation,
constantly looking over his shoulder at the alpha (de
Waal2000).
Gordon (1998) casts doubt that even humans, on
the other hand, have a ToM because interpreting our
own quotidian social behavior depends primarily on
such rapid computations of behavioral subtleties (e.g.
vocal inflections) that do "not await casual analysis."
In other words, our minds react to these observed minutiae, rather than an active mechanism abstracting
such details into a mental category. There are a number of problems inherent in this position. First, if all of
these "subtleties" that Gordon (1998) refers to are actually the sum-total ofthe stimuli, and behaviors that are
a response to the processing ofthat sum-total, this still
does not deny the possibility of a ToMM because such a
module requires stimulation for engagement. Secondly,
such arguments foreclose on the possibility of a "creative aspect" of chimpanzee behavior. The point is,

Gordon is taking a purely behaviorist approach to the
ToM-mostly a mental activity.
In addition, what Gordon does not acknowledge,
but alludes to (perhaps not consciously) is what Chomsky
calls "Plato's problem": "How is it possible that we have
the knowledge that we do have? What is the knowledge
that we do have and on what basis could we possibly
have acquired it?" (Chomsky 1980, 2004; Lightfoot 2005).
The strict behaviorist assumes such knowledge is
learned and behaviors are reacted to based on either
previous experience or processing a number of subtle
gestures that "do not await causal analysis." If such a
suite of subtleties do not "await causal analysis," then
such subtleties are arguably purely instinctual, rather
than a choice on the part of an agent. This fits nicely
with Fodor's definition of inaccessibility but denies the
ability of researchers to explain such behaviors. In
sum, then, the existence of a ToM cannot be ultimately
"proven" behaviorally or "behavioralistically."
Many have called such abilities "metarepresentations" (Sperber 2000). Andrew Whiten (2000)
differentiates two types of met are presentations. Sense
1 is "A mental representation of a mental representation." An example of this is (in your, the reader's, mind)
"John believes in ghosts." You understand that John's
belief in ghosts is a mental activity-so John's representation is now yours, so to speak. Sense 2 is "A
mental representation of a mental representation as a
representation (Sperber 2000). So, your understanding
that John's belief in ghosts is a representation is itselfa
representation. Do chimps have this ability?
Povinelli and Vonk (2003) note that there are two
things which supporters of chimp ToM must establish:
a) that chimpanzees are capable of abstracting behaviors and b) they can mentally represent mental states
(Sense 1). They argue that for the entire body of data
produced by chimpanzee observation to be of any explanatory value, only "behavioral abstractions will suffice." Similar observations made by Scott (2001) divide
the approaches between those who attribute ToM to
chimpanzees and those who simply learn "from past
experiences," in other words a representational memory
of behavior rather than a representational understanding of others' representations. However, as the elaborate experiments that Call et al. (2004) conducted indicate, chimpanzees not only have the ability-spontaneously-to interpret intentions (Sense 1), but also react
to them based on researchers' intentions as untrained
chimpanzees quickly learned to not bother waiting for
food that researchers refused to give.
Premack and Premack (1983, 2003) conducted a
study in which the chimpanzees were shown video-
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taped images of actors attempting to solve a number of
problems. In the first test, ~n actor attempt~d to re~ch
inaccessible bananas (hangIng overhead, lymg outsIde
a cage, blocked by a large box). In another number of
tests, actors were confronted with "malfunctioning
equipment: a disconnected hose, a phonograph whose
cord was unplugged, a gas heater that was unlit," etc.
(Premack and Premack 2003). After viewing the videos, Sarah (the Premacks' test subject) was given an
envelope with photos of the solution and solutions to
other problems. Initially, Sarah chose the correct solution to 18 out of 20 problems. The Premacks note that
her mistakes were likely due to "her ignorance of the
difference between chimpanzee and human strength"
(she "assumed" that a human could push a brick-filled
box aside, rather than empty it) and "an unclear photo."
Children, on the other hand who were presented with
this task, failed 50 percent of the time. Even after
altering the study to accommodate children's "suburban lifestyles" (e.g. cookies out of reach on top of a
refrigerator), they continued to fail at the same rate.
The Premacks argue that the difference lies in the
ability of chimps to identify, i.e. mentally represent, a
"problem" rather than a simple sequence of events on a
video. The chimps had to attribute agoal on the part of
the actors presented in the film, whereas three-and-ahalf year old children failed at a larger rate due to their
failure to attribute a goal to the actors. It would be
highly informative to give the same tests to older children, as their ToM is mostly fully functional (see above).
Can one still maintain the stance that Sarah may have
"learned" this ability-especially after being confronted
with a novel test? Sarah represented not only the
problem identified by the actors and the problem itself
(Sense 1), but recognized it as a problem (Sense 2).

CONCLUSIONS
Is it then safe to think of the ToM in an Either/Or
manner? If we discount the prescribed "collaborative
intentionality," chimpanzees, it would seem, have the
capacity to read other's minds-but with a limited number of abstraction-level mental state categories. The
category which they fail to fulfill is likely concomitant
to more socially complex animals-i.e. humans. If ToM
is modular, "collaborative intentionality" should not
necessarily be a condition-such an extra or more complex system of social cognition is likely equipped with
another cognitive mechanism at work-rather than
more encapsulated information. In other words, chimp
ToM is likely only equipped with the mental abstractions of "seeing" and "desiring," with an emphasis on
how to exploit others properly in order to benefit oneself
(egocentric) whereas human ToM can be employed to
accommodate collaborative intentionality-arguably
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made possible only by another psychological mechanism.
What a "degree" model would throw into question
is how developed our own ToM truly is in terms of
informational encapsulation and/or the limits of the
representational outgrowth of this mechanism. For
instance, it is probably not so much the case that "dreaming" is an innate concept, but such innate mental abstractions such as "knowing" or "believing" are evolutionarily sound mechanisms to have. It is also more
likely that such initial characteristics of human ToM
are not much different from a chimp's-we simply obtain more stimuli, both quantitatively and qualitatively,
which would expand our categories of others' mental
states. In sum, then, a ToM spectrum should stimulate
the question that there may be some variability in the
information encapsulated within our modules (as indicated by those with AS and high-functioning autism),
just as there is variability in our eyes, stomachs, etc. In
addition, it opens yet another question: is there variability in translation from essential information to behavior? Put differently, if our ToMM contains the same
essential elements that a chimp's does, why is there a
cognitive limitation on how it is used?
The debate need not be black or white in the case of
ToM. The question should not be whether or not chimpanzees have a ToM, but rather to what degree. Even
from the skeptics' corner (Povinelli and Vonk 2004), we
see evidence of "seeing as knowing" in chimpanzees,
but when compared to other primates, there is a clear
divide. Conducting the same experiments with other
primates, particularly the prosimians, will offer a truly
robust body of comparative knowledge. From an evolutionary standpoint, the chimpanzees' understanding of
others' mental states may simply be regarded as less
developed or more restricted than humans' yet more
articulated than other primates as recent research suggests. Moreover, determining whether any organism
has a ToM requires one but also requires not relying
solely on our own tendencies to infer mental states.
Future experiments should be designed for chimpanzees to attempt to deceive others in order to solve a
particular task without reflexively inferring that this
already occurs. Observational and anecdotal data are
equally important in order to observe chimpanzees and
other primates interacting naturally.
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